The rise and fall of the Ibrahim Bek movement - one of the most original patterns of socio-political conflicts within the area mainly located in Afghan Turkestan and the Soviet border, is still an unexplored issue despite its historical meaning and contemporary relevance. The existing scholarship on the subject (B.Hayit, H.B.Paksoy, W.Richter, Au.Shalinsky, etc) covers related data only within the broad scope of the so called Basmachi movement, missing some crucial episodes and developments, which occurred on Afghan soil during 1929-31. Fresh approaches were suggested recently by Russian Orientalists Yu.Gankovsky and Kh.Khashimbekov: they consider unrest under the leadership of Ibrahim Bek in Afghan Turkestan in 1930-31 as special event marking a new stage of Uzbek and other minorities movement against the Pashtun rulers of Afghanistan. The origins of the movement, its ethnic and military dimensions and nature, as well the consequences - form the multiple agenda of this paper, based on new data from Russian archives.

By the end of the 1920s Central Asian emigres, who left for Afghanistan because of Sovietization of their homelands and military fighting, consisted of about 200 thousand people and created one of the most marginalized strata of the Afghan population - they suffered from lack of land, water and other resources for survival and were manipulated by different forces: their native tribal/clan chiefs, local officials, and Kabul authorities. Such an attitude was the result of the growing shortcomings of the host himself - Amanullah's regime neared its end because of a failed reformist experiment. At the same time Kabul subsidized the establishment of the emigres, most of who were settled around the Afghan capital. In Fall 1928 - Winter 1929 domestic tensions finally resulted in the Afghan civil war and the division of the country among several centers of power. Central Asian emigration expressed its loyalty to the new Kabul ruler, Tajik Bacha-e-Saqao, - at a crucial moment of joint Soviet-Amanullist action in the Afghan North (Ghulam Nabi - V.Primakov military expedition, labeled often as the first Soviet invasion to Afghanistan) Ibrahim Bek's detachment fought on Saqavists' side. However, the emigres basically were not happy with the new ruler either, - the latter tried to manipulate them, ordering them to demolish Hazara opposition or carry out similar duties. At the same time, Saqao's regime incorporated some influential emigres into its own ranks: thus, Uzbek-Lokay Ibrahim Bek, one of the former leaders of the Basmachi movement, became military commander of the Khanabad area with four thousand well-equipped soldiers. New Afghan military law allowed even common emigres to get their pick: it was announced that the Afghan army would be recruited on a voluntarily basis, and some emigres immediately joined it as a kind of employment.

In October 1929 Kabul was captured by Pashtun tribal militia under the leadership of Amanullah's former minister of war, Nadir-khan. Central Asian emigres at this stage of intra-Afghan conflict took a neutral stance, but their previous pro-Saqao connection gave them an image of being untrustworthy and potentially dangerous. Some subjective and objective factors made new conflict unavoidable: initially Nadir-khan's regime pursued a set of measures in favor of emigres (free settlement in any Afghan area, tax-exemption for 3 years, renewed incorporation into government structures - Ibrahim Bek was appointed for this time as wali-assistant of Mazari Sharif), and made several gestures of reconciliation (Jakub-khan's special commission and the efforts to hold a multi-national jirga, suggested as a loyal substitute to central power), but eventually turned to the use of force. "Nadirat" realized, that his survival would depend on two decisive factors: the ability to disarm the entire Northern population, first of all the Central Asian emigres, and then to establish real economic control, including the collection of taxes - a painful problem for devastated country. Both these lines of policy, reinforced by officials robbery and the ethnically colored humiliation of the northern population, resulted in efforts to overthrow Nadir's rule.

The first coup d'etat in summer 1930, orchestrated by former Saqavists and Amanullists, suggested the participation of Ibrahim Bek's forces, but it failed because of a struggle for leadership inside the opposition. Another challenge came from the north: the Soviet military command waged a campaign, during which Ibrahim Bek's strong points in Aliabad and Ak-Teke were demolished.

The violation of Afghanistan sovereignty was justified under the old label of Basmachi banditry. The offensive politics of "Nadirat" and its intention to resolve the problems of the country by the stake of northern minorities resulted in a terrible new conflict, which was shaped by wide-spread unrest with Central Asian emigres as the main military force and Ibrahim Bek as undisputed leader of this multi-ethnic movement (among its participants were Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz and even small number of Pashtuns!). This movement was broadly-based socially - it was supported by common peasants, nomads, merchants as well landlords, Muslim clergy, etc - whose position was damaged by war and an unclear future. The leaders of the movement advanced slogans to establish an independent Uzbek-Tajik-Turkoman state, but they failed to develop a meaningful program as well the structure of working governance/self-governance. Some doubts remained with regard to the future state leadership - the former Bukhara emir, Ibrahim Bek himself, and other figures were suggested for this position. "Nadirat" managed to benefit from these rival's weaknesses, especially as some of the local population had really tired of the longtime war.

The final defeat of Ibrahim Bek movement was postponed by opportunistic clandestine Soviet policies: being interested in their eventual demolition, Soviet intelligence tried to manipulate "Ibrahimists", thus stimulating the tension in Afghan Turkestan as well as the politicization of local population, demonstrating to the new Afghan regime their Big Neighbor's ability to correct the Afghan domestic and regional situation in one or another desired direction. 7 March, 1931 became a turning and really final point for Ibrahim Bek and his followers: they were suddenly crushed by 4 thousands Turkoman cavalry: the Turkoman changed their mind to keep at least neutrality and in such a surprising way ended the agenda not just of an independent/autonomous Afghan Turkestan state (in a geographical sense), but even for Central Asian emigration, with mainly Bukharan/Uzbek nuclei, as a meaningful socio-political opposition/community, able to balance the extreme shifts, forceful or intentional, of the pro-Pashtun establishment in Afghanistan. Turkoman collaborates were granted Afghan military titles and 2-months salary of 80 rupees - indeed, a modest price for such long-standing output. Shortly after this defeat Ibrahim Bek crossed the Soviet border for further struggle, but was forced to surrender and was executed in 1932. More careful analysis proves that the formula and the very idea of an independent North Afghan state under the realities of 1920s-30s had no prospects, because the only powerful outside beneficiary at that moment was Great Britain. The Soviets rejected it, suspecting permanent intra-national tensions and preferred to deal in the short and middle run with modest Pashtun regime of Nadir-khan and his descendants.